This article, written by Dr. John W. Kitchens, Aviation Branch Command Historian, U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, AL, originally appeared in Army Aviation Digest in two parts (Nov/Dec ’92 and Jan/Feb ’93, respectively).

The U.S. Air Force was still determined to stop the growth of Army Aviation, even throughout the Korean Conflict.

Names such as Devers, Gavin, Collins, and Pace are remembered for addressing the continuing questions:
Who gets the best missions, Army of Air Force?

When the Korean Conflict began 24 June 1950, the Army had only 56 helicopters in its inventory. All these were then called utility aircraft – 52 Bell H-13B Sioux and four older models Bell YH-13A.

When fighting ended in July 1953, the Army had an inventory of more than 800 helicopters: 460 H-13s, 405 of which were the newest E model; 262 Hiller H-23 Ravens, mostly the improved B Model; 72 Sikorsky H-19C Chicksaw cargo helicopters; and 13 Piasecki H-25 Army Mule cargo helicopters.

About two-thirds of these aircraft were acquired during the last year of the conflict. Fewer than 200 reached Korea before the war ended. The Army received its first Piasecki (Vertol) H-21C Seminole in September 1954 – over a year after the conflict ended.

Plans and Missions

The Army completed plans to organize and train five transportation helicopter companies within 6 weeks of the beginning of hostilities. Because of the shortage of cargo helicopters and U.S. Air Force (USAF) opposition to any expansion of Army Aviation, the first of these companies did not become operational in Korea until March 1953, about 4 months before the end of the war.

Since the birth of Army Aviation in 1942, the Army Ground Forces had attempted repeatedly to expand its air arm and escape restrictions and controls placed upon it. Conversely, the Army Air Forces-USAF had repeatedly tried to eliminate or absorb the ground forces’ air arm, perceived as a rival for scarce resources. Failing to achieve that objective, the USAF was determined to prevent Army Aviation from expanding its mission.

In mid-1950, the mission of Army aircraft was controlled by the terms of three major documents – the National Security Act of 1947; the Key West Agreement of 1948; and the Joint Army Air Force (JAAF) Adjustment Regulations 5-1001 of 1949.

These documents restricted the missions of Army aircraft to observation, reconnaissance, local messenger and courier service, and emergency wire laying and evacuation. They also limited aerial resupply and photographic missions.

Other aerial functions, including nonemergency courier, messenger, evacuation, supply, photography, and wire laying were assigned to the USAF. The USAF also controlled procurement, research and development (R&D), and much of the training and maintenance for Army Aviation. Furthermore, the weight of Army helicopters would not exceed 4,000 pounds when empty.

During the early years of the Cold War, the USAF neglected the Army’s requirements for R&D on helicopters and other light aircraft.

The low priority given to the aircraft and air support needs of the ground forces caused some Army leaders to attempt to have the Army assume greater responsibility for its own aircraft development, procurement, and air support. The Army’s efforts to procure and employ light cargo helicopters during the Korean War era made up one more chapter in the continuing rivalry between the two services.

Overview

Medevac

Cargo Helicopters

Messengers

Payroll