March 2: (Germany) A counterattack in force was reported coming across the Erft Canal in the Grevenbroich area. This was miles behind our leading elements, and we sent an air OP back to investigate. It happened that Lieutenant Kistler and Moyer were the crew of this air OP, and they had an opportunity to indulge their specialty of interposing themselves between our fighter-bombers in the air and our troops on the ground. According to Moyer, the P-47s knocked out five enemy tanks and six of ours. A picture of this action appeared in an issue of LIFE with the caption that an American column shown on fire had been destroyed by the enemy. They were, in fact, destroyed by our own fighter-bombers…

March: (Rhine River) The Luftwaffe, in this area for the first time, made an organized attack upon our air OPs. Although I cannot verify the figure, I remember eleven as the number of our air OPs which were shot down in Ninth US Army by these attacks in less than a week. Compared with the number of light aircraft which were concentrated in the area, this number is insignificant. One of our own aircraft was shot down, wounding both the pilot and the observer, and we had an accurate description of the method of the attack. Lieutenant Reid, pilot, and Lieutenant Middleton, observer, were on a routine mission, patrolling the front of the 113^th Cavalry Group on March 17^th. The first they knew of their being attacked was when 20mm tracers struck their Cub, coming from below and behind. Reid proceeded to make a crash landing. Four ME 109s had made the pass from across the Rhine at about fifty feet altitude. After the crash, the enemy fighters strafed the crashed plane on the ground. Two of these fighters were shot down by our AA fire while trying to escape.

An isolated attack of this kind could be attributed to chance. In connection with the other attacks along the Ninth Army Front, however, the element of chance in such precise attacks can be discharged. It is obvious that the fighters were directed to their target by some control method which enabled them to cross the Rhine at very low altitude and at the exact time which would allow them to make the attack from below and to the rear.

Any number of methods could be employed effectively for arrangement, from radar direction to simple visual observation by concealed observer on the ground, and radio contact with the fighter flight in the air. The boldness and the unconcern of the air OP personnel, growing out of the months of safety, contributed to the success of the enemy scheme. Variations of pattern, course, altitude, and speed would lessen the chance of a fighter attack being able to stalk the flight without being seen…

March 31: (Across the Rhine) We began to have a siege of losses in our air OPs. We were many miles ahead of other troops in our vicinity, and the Cubs had no protection except when they were immediately over the columns. The enemy fighters downed one almost every day for a while. The exploit of Lieutenant Emerick and Captain Mahon near Ahlen demonstrates the safety of the Cub-type airplane. They were attacked by twelve ME 109s. One flight made a pass at them on the way down, and when they arrived on the deck, the twelve were coming at them from the rear in line abreast.

If they continued straight ahead, the flight immediately in rear would get a shot at them, while if they turned in either direction they would come under fire of the flights to either side. They were flying just above some small pine trees and Emerick dipped his wing into the trees. The airplane snapped over and crashed on its back. Emerick and Mahon scrambled out and hid in an irrigation ditch while the fighters strafed the crashed plane. After the fighters left, they recovered their radio and walked across country a mile to join the column. On the way, incidentally, they picked up a German machine gun crew as prisoners.

This escape was partially miraculous, and partially attributed to the L-4. It was simple, light, and slow. There were no gadgets for the pilot to work and no problems of speed control such as there would have been if the pilot had had to work flaps. The terminal velocity of its dive was low enough so that there was no problem of killing off a lot of extra air speed near the ground. Such an escape in an L-5 would have been almost impossible. As it was, Emerick and Mahon were flying again the next day, although Mahon did complain of a stiff neck…

April 2: (Elbe River) The weather prevented observation by either air or ground OPs. Although on the surface the day appeared to be clear, actually there was a strong inversion with the usual accompanying haze and our observation was simply ineffective. It was a day of frustration and desperation. The air OPs flew out farther and farther in efforts to suppress the hostile fire, but they did not succeed…

Therefore, the first lesson of World War II was that our artillery doctrines are sound. The fire direction center, the air OPs, the forward observers, and the plans of massive artillery fire were developed before the war step by step with development of communicative equipment…

It is a forgone conclusion that air observation will always be necessary on the battlefield. The air OPs of the last war did a remarkable job and an air OP will be required in the next war. If antiaircraft developments force the abandonment of the commercial-type light aircraft, some other solutions will be required. The ultimate in this would be a standard fighter, but it is hoped that this solution will not be necessary since it will remove the very essential close control and coordination of employment by the battalion commander…

Brigadier General Carl I. Hutton was Commandant of the U.S. Army Aviation School from July 1954 until June 1957. In March 1944, he commanded the 14^th Field Artillery Battalion and in August 1944, assumed command of the 2d Armored Division Artillery, where he remained until September 1946. It is in this period of combat in Europe about which he writes in this article.