In 1939 war broke
out in Europe, and by 1940 military activity in the United States was
increasing by leaps and bounds, for it seemed likely that we would
eventually be drawn in. (My class at Leavenworth was turned out in January
1940, ahead of the scheduled June, to go to units in field training.)
Agitation for better air observation grew in intensity, led by chief of
Field Artillery, Major General Robert M. Danford. This attracted the
attention of the three leading light aircraft manufacturers: Aeronca, Piper,
and Taylorcraft. Aggressive businessmen, they got into the act and placed
one or more civilian aircraft with company pilots, at the disposal of every
senior commander in every large scale Army maneuver conducted during 1940 to
1941 in Louisiana, Tennessee and elsewhere. Toward the end a veritable
squadron of planes was in action during the Desert Maneuvers at Ft. Bliss:
eight from Piper and two each from Aeronca and Taylorcraft. The missions
performed were mostly courier and command reconnaissance, though there
apparently was some adjustment (simulated) of artillery fire.
An amusing incident occurred in the course of the
Desert Maneuvers, Henry Wann, one of the Piper pilots, was told to fly to
the field headquarters of the First Cavalry Brigade and report to the
commander, Major General Innis P. Swift. Wann located the headquarters and
landed and reported. General Swift seemed quite impressed. He said,
"You looked just like a damn grasshopper when you landed that thing out
there in the boondocks and bounced around." Thus
"Grasshopper" became the proud title of the early Army aviators.
At this point my 20 years’ service as an
artilleryman, my modest experience as an air observer, and my years of
private flying came into conjunctive focus: Why not make air observation
organic to the artillery itself? Each battalion would have its own light
plane operating from a nearby field or road, with its own artilleryman pilot
and artillery observer, constantly and instantly available to the battalion
commander.
In the fall of 1940 I wrote an article along these
lines, published in the Field Artillery Journal of April 1941, recommending
organic air observation for Field Artillery. As to the need, I said, in
part:
"During the Third Army maneuvers in the early
part of 1940 this writer was a battery commander in the light artillery of a
"streamlined" division. During successive division, corps and army
exercises he participated in a number of field problems. Not once,
during this period of 4 months, did he hind a decent OP! Not once did he
have a map or map substitute from which fire could have been computed! Not
once was an actual air observer available to adjust the fire of his
battalion!"
As to feasibility and type of plane:
"The plane for our Field Artillery battalion
should go with that battalion at all times. The ‘flivver’ plane, with
its light wing loading and its 75 HP engine, cruises at about 80 mph and
lands at about 45 mph. It does not require a prepared landing field, but can
land in almost any cow pasture or similar place. Hundreds of landings and
take-offs have been made on highways. Even plowed fields are practicable
provided the furrows are not deep."
As to vulnerability:
"Objection will be heard that such a craft
will be quite vulnerable to hostile aviation. Well, what aircraft isn’t?
Only the best of the fighters themselves. Does anyone think, for example,
that our present service type observation ship, the O-47, would bear a
charmed life in an atmosphere infested with enemy pursuit? Of what use are
one or two flexible machine guns, firing to the rear, against the eight
fixed forward guns of the modern fighter?
"Our little flivver plane will have no
armament at all: its protection will consist in:
- General superiority of the air secured by our
pursuit aviation. Let no one say we may not have this. We may not
win the war, but we should try. We should try, likewise, to gain air
superiority. No modern war has been won without it. Of course not even a
definite air superiority on our part will render us immune from enemy
air attack. But such superiority, or merely an equality, should make it
possible for us to employ observation aviation without prohibitive
losses, especially if other protective measures are adopted.
- Observing from low-altitudes over own
territory. Low-flying airplanes, particularly if painted camouflage,
are hard to see from above. If enemy fighters cruise at low
altitudes our ground weapons should be able to make it hot for them.
Maneuverability. Upon the approach of hostile
aircraft our pilot will put the little ship into a series of right turns,
barely off the ground; high-speed enemy fighters, much less maneuverable,
will have difficulty in bringing their guns to bear."
