Well, what
happened? The article in the Journal excited much favorable comment:
the light aircraft manufacturers placed a dozen or so planes and pilots at
the disposal of the senior commanders in the maneuvers of 1941, but not much
else took place.
Opponents of the idea claimed, first, that Field
Artillerymen couldn’t fly these planes from roads and small fields, they’d
break their necks; second, that if they managed to fly them as proposed, the
necessary maintenance could not be performed under primitive field
conditions; third, that if it happened by some miracle that the planes could
be so flown and maintained, they’d be shot down the first day of battle.
So the "experts" were opposed. The Air
Corps was opposed for an additional reason. It had been too long under the
tutelage of the Army not to know the uses of bureaucracy and it wasn’t
about to let air observation slip from its hands any more than the
Army, some years earlier, in the days of Billy Mitchell, had been willing to
let the Air Corps slip from its hands to become an independent arm.
Despite this strong opposition, the idea would not
die. The commanders who in the 1940 and 1941 maneuvers had been served by
the light planes lent by the aircraft manufacturers were enthusiastic in
their support. General Danford visited the artillery school in England
during the summer, and came away impressed by the efforts being made there
to use light aircraft for artillery observation. I talked to him later that
fall when he came to Ft. Sill, OK and was delighted to realize his strong
support of the proposal that a test of my theory be made. His staff was
plugging for it with G-3 of the War Department, and finally, on 5 December
1941, a formal proposal to this effect was made to the Chief of Staff,
General George C. Marshall.
It is doubtful whether the proposition would have
gone any further in the absence of a strong push from a new direction. But 2
days later, on 7 December 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor with
devastating effect. The event caught some of the big brass, military and
civilian, with their pants down, and scared the pants off nearly everyone
else. People had nightmares of Japanese scaling the cliffs of California. On
10 December the Chief of Staff directed the chief of Field Artillery to
proceed with the proposed tests.
I was called to Washington a few days later and
worked with General Danford’s staff on the details of a directive which he
would issue to the commanding general, Ft. Sill, covering the training phase
of the program. This directive was issued on 23 December 1941, and on 2
January 1942, I was appointed director of Air Training.
On my way to Washington I had been visited on the
train during the brief stop in Cincinnati by Major Gordon J. Wolf, a Field
Artillery Reservist, who had heard of the program and wanted to join. He was
an enthusiastic private flyer with several years experience, of great
energy, intelligence and imagination. I gladly accepted his offer, and he
became my second in command. He contributed outstandingly to the operation.
Incredibly, on 15 January 1942, actual training for
the tests began. That so much had been accomplished in a scant month is
explained only by the heroic efforts of all concerned under the impetus of
war.
Arrangements had been made as follows:
- The chief of Army Air Corps had turned over Post
Field, Ft. Sill, for use in the project; had furnished 24 Piper Cub
airplanes (commercial J-3s painted olive drab) and associated equipment;
and would supply 80-octane aviation fuel.
- The chief of Field Artillery had sent circulars
to all field artillery units in the United States, inviting applications
for participation in the test from officers and enlisted men having
civilian pilot licenses with private pilot or higher grade. Fourteen
officers and 19 enlisted men were thus selected and they reported to Ft.
Sill for training.
- The Civilian Aeronautics Administration (CAA)
lent Mr. Richard Alley to serve as chief flight instructor, and Mr.
Stanford J. Stelle to serve as maintenance supervisor. It also
recommended seven flight instructors of extensive experience in the type
of flying contemplated. These instructors were hired by the Field
Artillery School and served throughout the training period prior to the
field tests. Included in their number were two, Tony Piper and Henry
Wann, who had been active as pilots for the light aircraft manufacturers
in the maneuvers of 1940 and 1941. Both of them, and Ted Schirmacher,
another of the civilian flight instructors, obtained commissions and
continued as military pilots throughout the war.
- The aircraft and engine manufacturers sent
experienced people to assist: Mr. Forrest I Nearing from Piper and Mr.
Chester Hammond from Continental.