In the beginning
the pilots had been given a review of basic flying
maneuvers, lasting about 10 hours. Several were
dropped from training during this period, due to
lack of aptitude of unsatisfactory rate of progress.
Then, after some 20 hours or so of practice on small
fields and roads, came the third and final phase:
the actual conduct of fire. The splendid Ft. Sill
firing ranges were made available, along with
well-trained firing batteries and skilled fire
direction centers (FDCs). The observer, having
conferred with the FDCs as to the mission to be
flown, would go to his plane nearby, the plane would
take off at once, and as soon as the target area was
in sight the command to fire was given. Adjustment
would be rapidly concluded and the plane would land.
The average time achieved from takeoff to landing,
was about 9 minutes. This was for personnel in
training; skilled pilot-observer teams sometimes did
it in as little as 6 minutes. During this part of
the training the observer was usually a second pilot
in the aircraft; but in the field the observer would
be a junior officer in the Field Artillery unit
served, he having been already well-trained at Ft.
Sill, in the conduct of fire.
The War Department had directed that the training
phase at Ft. Sill be completed by 28 February 1942,
after which the real tests, in the field, would be
conducted. In less than 3 months since Pearl Harbor
there had been assembled, trained and made ready a
unit prepared to demonstrate the capability of an
entirely new kind of military aviation.
Of the 14 officers and 19 enlisted men who
reported for this training, 3 officers and 10
enlisted men failed to complete the course. Probably
there would have been fewer failures had the course
been not so condensed. The average flying time at
the beginning of the course was, for officers, 187
hours; for enlisted men, 70. This explains the
disparity of results between the two groups. The
average hours flown during the course by students
completing same was 39. Enlisted pilots completing
the course were immediately promoted to staff
sergeant.
There were no accidents! Well, no serious
accidents.
On 28 February 1942, the training detachment,
later to become known as the Class Before One, was
divided into two groups. Flight "A,"
consisting of 11 airplanes and 14 officers and men,
to go to Ft. Bragg, NC, for service tests with the
13th Field Artillery Brigade; Flight
"B," consisting of 10 airplanes and 14
officers and men, to go to the 2d Infantry Division,
Ft. Sam Houston, TX, for the same purpose. I was not
a member of either group, although I led Flight A on
the flight to Ft. Bragg and remained there as
observer and consultant for most of the test period,
then moving to Ft. Sam Houston for the same purpose.
The field tests were to be made with troops
actually on maneuvers, where the utility and
practicability of organic air observation for field
artillery could be assessed. A new element was now
introduced for evaluation: the vulnerability of
these small planes to hostile aircraft. Actually
this was the only element in doubt. If the little
planes could live in battle, there was no doubt that
they could operate from landing areas or roads
somewhere near the guns they served; there was no
doubt they could maintain the planes in operational
condition; there was no doubt they could bring fire,
unerringly, upon any target within range of the
guns, and this by staying over our own lines out of
reach of enemy ground fire. But what about hostile
aircraft? We hoped that the evasive maneuver
previously described would neutralize this danger.
Shortly after Flight A arrived at Fr. Bragg, the
13th Field Artillery Brigade moved to
Camp Blanding, FL, where the actual tests were to be
run. Flight A went along, finding an acceptable
landing strip on a sandy lane in the pines near
brigade headquarters. An Air Corps fighter squadron,
based nearby, was designated to furnish the air
opposition. Flying P-39s equipped with gun cameras,
they were to take pictures of our Cubs in the air,
thus proving the Cubs would be shot down while
flying their observation missions, and on the
ground, proving our attempts to hide planes under
trees while not on missions were ineffective.
We were worried about this. Not only at the
prospect of having some high-speed fighter whiz by
you a few feet away (suppose he miscalculated?), but
more so at the thought that he had just taken a
picture of you as he shot you down. These pictures
might convince higher authority that our whole
scheme was impractical.
