Rivalry between the AAF and the AGF over organic aviation had surfaced in 1940, when the ground forces began testing the concept. Friction between the two major Army commands became more pronounced during the latter half of 1942. One aspect of the dispute concerned the selection, training, and rating of pilots.

Field Artillery, preferred that its "pilot-observers" be officers, branch-trained artillery officers insofar as possible. On the other hand, all AAF liaison pilots were noncommissioned officers (NCOs). War Department leaders originally expected that most of the Field Artillery pilots would be NCOs also. Furthermore, the AAF believed that the liaison pilot should be trained only to operate light aircraft and that the "passenger-observer," who need not be a pilot, should be responsible for fire adjustment.

Most of the licensed volunteers who completed the tactical training course during the early months of the program were officers. When the AAF began training and rating pilots to send to Fort Sill in September 1942, the air forces selected and trained enlisted men according to their policy regarding the rank of liaison pilots.

Since the AAF had already combed the Army for aviation volunteers, however, it was difficult to find qualified persons willing to serve as enlisted pilots. All trainees of the first group sent to Fort Sill, for example, consisted of rejected aviation cadets.

The instructors at Fort Sill found many of the men selected, trained, and rated as liaison pilots by the AAF to be inadequately trained, or other wise unqualified, when they arrived for advanced tactical training.

Conversely, the air forces, with exclusive authority to rate Army pilots, challenged the qualifications of some of the licensed pilots admitted to the advanced course at Fort Sill without having received training under the auspices of the AAF. The commandant of the Field Artillery School reported, on 28 September 1942, that the procedures for the selection, training, and rating of pilots were "chaotic." He proposed that the ground forces be given exclusive responsibility for these functions.

The assistant secretary of war called a series of meeting of high-level AAF and AGF representatives in response to reports of personnel selection and pilot rating problems in organic Army Aviation. Compromise agreements were reached in late 1942 and early 1943. Field Artillery won on two points and lost on two others.

First, the "pilot-observer" concept was accepted; the pilot-observers were to be officers trained to adjust field artillery fire. The pilot-observer of each aircraft was to be accompanied by a radioman-mechanic, who also helped watch for hostile planes and assisted in fire adjustment.

Second, the AGF gained responsibility for and control over the selection of volunteers for the organic aviation program. The AAF, however, retained responsibility for providing primary flight training and for conferring pilot ratings.

Most of the enlisted men rated as liaison pilots before April 1943 were subsequently commissioned. It should be noted, however, that some NCOs remained in organic Army Aviation and performed creditable service in all major theaters throughout the war.

The conflict between the AAF and the AGF erupted on another issue in late 1942. General McNair had been lukewarm toward organic aviation in Field Artillery when it was established. However, he became a staunch supporter before the end of the year. He accordingly proposed, on 16 November, that the program be extended to other branches of the ground forces.

MG George E. Stratemeyer, Chief of the Air Staff, responded 3 days later with a counterproposal that all Field Artillery aviation be discontinued and replaced by air forces liaison flights. All AGF aviation personnel and planes were to be transferred to these AAF liaison flights, which would be assigned to each army, corps, and division to support the ground commanders.

Organic Army Aviation was already coming to be recognized as an excellent solution to the problem of aerial adjustment. Since the AAF observation squadrons continued to fail to provide reliable artillery support, General Stratemeyer’s proposal was not given serious consideration.

General McNair’s proposal, however, in effect called for the acquisition of more liaison-type planes than would have become available for all the armed services during 1943. Therefore, the War Department rejected it. Although organic ground force aviation continued to expand gradually, its official mission did not change until 1945.

These AAF-AGF conflicts during the infancy of organic Army Aviation were harbingers of a rivalry that would continue for more than three decades. The very existence of a second Army air arm, albeit minuscule in comparison to the AAF, constituted a constant temptation for the AGF (later the Army) to expand it; it also created a potential rival for the AAF (later the USAF) to either absorb or destroy.