Organic Army Aviation first entered combat in North Africa in late 1942. On 9 November, four Army liaison pilots flew three L-4s from the deck of the USS Ranger, a carrier participating in the invasion of North Africa.

Since the captain of the Ranger refused to break radio silence to announce the presence of these Piper Cubs – unusual aircraft to be seen at sea during an invasion – they were fired upon by American ships and shore batteries. The plane flown by Captain (CPT) Ford E. Alcorn, was hit and crash landed on shore, but all the pilots survived.

Before the end of November, several other L-4s and Army Aviators arrived in North Africa, where they were assigned to armored and infantry divisions. LT Paul A. Dewitt was reported to be the first Army Aviator to fly a Grasshopper in an artillery mission in combat.

During the North African campaign, there were not enough aircraft and pilots for all artillery units. A program for training additional pilot-observers in North Africa encountered bureaucratic hurdles and achieved only limited success.

With the aircraft available to them in North Africa, the pilot-observers learned several valuable lessons that they passed back to the Department of Air Training at Fort Sill. These included staying airborne much longer than had been intended, flying at dusk to locate enemy artillery positions more effectively, and nighttime flying.

As early as the North African campaign, the exigencies of war and the availability of the organic aircraft caused them to be used for purposes other than artillery fire adjustment. These other uses included command and control, medical evacuation, and aerial photography.

The obvious value of the L-4s in these missions fomented the AGF effort to expand organic aviation to other Army branches in 1943.

With more planes and pilot-observers available, the role of organic Army Aviation expanded as allies moved from North Africa to Sicily, CPT Brenton Devol, Jr., who had flown one of the first L-4s off the U.S. Ranger, constructed a flight deck on a landing ship transport (LST).

Later at Anzio, in the Italian campaign, L-4s tool off from the decks of LSTs and participated in combat. Nighttime artillery fire adjustment became common during the Italian campaign. Since the L-4 had no built in navigation instruments and no panel lights, however, night flying was a problem; hand-hel flashlights were sometimes used. Army aviators who made significant contributions to the development of techniques for artillery fire adjustment at night included O. Glenn Goodhand (later a brigadier general) and Delbert Bristol (later a colonel).

Additional missions performed by organic Army Aviation during the Italian campaign consisted of adjustment of offshore naval gunfire, laying wire, emergency light transport, courier service, aerial photography, and reconnaissance.

In northern Italy, and later in southern France and in other theaters, AGF planes were also used in so-called "Horsefly" missions. These missions assisted high-performance fighters and bombers in locating close-in targets on which Army ground units desired air strikes. One of the pioneers in planning and conducting Horsefly operations was MAJ John Oswalt.

The aerial adjustment of artillery fire was both the purpose for the establishment of organic Army Aviation and its single most important function during WWII. After it came to be accepted by artillery commanders, organic aviation was a complete success in this mission.

The AAF observation squadrons, which were to have shared responsibility for artillery fire adjustment, proved unworkable in combat, and virtually all aerial artillery fire adjustment was provided by organic aviation.

That the 65 horsepower L-4s were effective in artillery fire adjustment and that they had several advantages over AAF aircraft had been amply demonstrated before they first entered combat. However, many observers still doubted that L-4s could survive in a hostile environment. As it turned out, they were very survivable.

Their defense against enemy fighters, when allies did not have command of the skies, was to roll over and dive toward allied anti-aircraft batteries, which would then open fire on the pursuing enemy aircraft. Their defense against enemy ground fire was their radio, with which they could direct artillery fire on the enemy battery.

The result was that, when the L-4s were in the air over enemy lines, enemy aircraft tended to stay away, and enemy anti-aircraft batteries tended to hide. In many cases, in fact, an L-4 was kept in the air during daylight hours for its counterbattery effect – not only on enemy artillery but also on anti-aircraft batteries.

The L-4 was an excellent aircraft for daytime adjustment of artillery fire, as well as for many other uses. Major advantages included its maneuverability and the small space requirement for take-off and landing. Shortcomings of the L-4 included its lack of panel lights, its limited range and speed, and its inability to operate at high altitudes in mountainous terrain.