Rivalry between AGF and the Army Air Forces (AAF), later the U.S. Air Force, over the role and mission of organic Army Aviation began with the initial testing of the concept and continued for over 30 years. The AAF viewed organic aviation with wariness, when not with outright hostility.

The air forces failed to furnish the ground forces with the type and quality of aerial support being provided by organic aviation. In spite of this, leaders blocked the expansion of the tiny new air arm of the AGF and, on occasion, attempted to absorb or abolish it. Conversely, the AGF sought to expand the size, mission, and authority of organic Army Aviation. Disputes between the two Army commands were allayed temporarily through compromise or War Department edict, only to resurface later.

The principal aircraft used by organic aviation during World War II (WWII) was the Piper L-4. It was an excellent plane for daytime artillery fire adjustment, as well as for several other types of missions. From the time the L-4 first entered combat in North Africa in 1942, however, several shortcomings became apparent; limited range and speed, inability to operate at high altitudes, and problems involved in nighttime flying.

The liaison plane most widely used by the AAF was the L-5, manufactured by Stinson Aircraft Division of Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation. Compared to the L-4, the 185-horsepower L-5 was faster, could operate at high altitudes and carry more weight, had a longer range, and was easier to operate at night.

As early as the North African campaign, some ground units began to request the larger Stinson aircraft for use in mountainous areas. Although the ground forces managed to acquire a few L-5s for testing in 1942 and 1943, no others were authorized for the AGF until 1944.

One reason why the AGF did not request more L-5s was ground forces leaders believed the acquisition of higher performance aircraft would intensify the AAF opposition to organic Army Aviation.

The L-5 aircraft generally were not needed for artillery fire adjustment. Moreover, the War Department, as well as the AGF, tended to be cautious with regard to any suggestion of officially expanding the mission of organic Army Aviation. For example, it was widely known portable cameras were used in L-4s for aerial photography. In February 1944, however, the War Department disapproved a proposal to upgrade this aircraft by mounting cameras because of AAF opposition.

In mid-1943, the AGF in Italy acquired a few L-5s intended for the AAF but mistakenly sent to a Field Artillery unit. According to several sources, the ground forces first used L-5s in combat following the allied breakthrough at Anzio in early 1944.

It seems, however, the AGF may have sent a couple of the L-5s, acquired for testing to North Africa in 1943.

In January 1944, the AAF made another concentrated effort to abolish organic Army Aviation. Air forces leaders were alarmed by the attempts of some ground commanders to obtain higher performance aircraft. They were also concerned about the rapidly expanding use of the L-4s for various missions that had been assigned to the AAF. This concern precipitated the air forces’ attempted takeover of January 1944.

In a memorandum for the chief of staff of the Army, General (GEN) Henry H. Arnold, the commanding general of the AAF, charged that organic aviation was overextended, wasteful of resources, and unsound in principle. Furthermore, he claimed, it was being used primarily for unauthorized and unintended purposes.

He then repeated (but more vigorously than on prior occasions) the air forces’ recommendation to discontinue organic Army Aviation and resume all liaison and artillery fire adjustment functions by the recently organized AAF liaison squadrons.

GEN Arnold was correct in charging that the de facto role and mission of organic Army Aviation had expanded considerably beyond what had originally been authorized. He ignored the fact, however, that the expansion had resulted from the exigencies of combat and from the failure of the AAF to provide the AGF with adequate liaison-type aerial support.

Also, some of Arnold’s allegations (for example, his charge that only 5 percent of organic aviation’s missions were "for the purpose of adjustment of artillery fire") were gross exaggerations. When organic aviation was authorized in 1942, it was intended not to replace but "to supplement the AAF’s responsibility for aerial adjustment of artillery fire" from high-performance aircraft.

Since few of the AAF squadrons that were to have provided this support were actually organized, however, organic aircraft of the AGF provided almost all fire adjustment as well as many other liaison functions during WWII.

In May of 1943, the AAF obtained authorization to organize liaison flights or squadrons, in lieu of the discredited air forces observation squadrons, to support the ground forces. These flights were only beginning to be organized in early 1944. GEN Arnold wanted to hasten the process by having the AAF flights absorb organic Army Aviation and take over its assets and functions. Apparently none of the new AAF liaison flights arrived in the European Theater until mid-1944. Between then and January 1945, the AAF assigned a total of eight liaison squadrons of 32 planes each to the AGF operating in Europe.

In response to GEN Arnold’s memorandum of January 1944, Lieutenant General (LTG) Lesley J. McNair, the commander of the AGF, took issue with some of Arnold’s exaggerated charges bout the use and cost of organic Army Aviation. The thrust of his rejoinder, however, was to observe the main issue was satisfactory air observation for Field Artillery. He asserted artillery air observation by the AAF had never been satisfactory, but that organic aviation was performing this mission in an outstanding manner.

As to wasting resources, LTG McNair observed the cost of organic aviation was "microscopically small as compared with the cost of the air forces as a whole," and was hardly even a factor in the discussion. He, therefore, strongly objected to GEN Arnold’s proposed change – especially at that critical time of the war.

The War Department accepted LTG McNair’s recommendation that no change be made in organic aviation. To avert a renewal of the controversy, however, the War Department spokesman warned that, should the mission of the ground forces aviation arm be expanded in the future, GEN Arnold could renew his demand that organic aviation be transferred to the AAF.

The War Department also expressed the hope the new AAF liaison squadrons would provide the requisite courier and other liaison service so organic Army Aviation would no longer be diverted from its primary mission.

While GEN Arnold doubtlessly would have desired the total abolition of organic Army Aviation, his demand for such an action may well have been intended, as a practical matter, to prevent its further growth. At any rate, his demand and the War Department's threat to reconsider it appears to have contributed to increased caution on the part of the ground forces leaders. For a few months, they were somewhat quieter with regard to acquiring higher performance aircraft, making modifications on the L-4, and obtaining official recognition of the de facto expanded role of organic aviation.

Few, if any, of the AAF liaison squadrons being organized to support the AGF reached Europe before the beginning of the Normandy invasion; therefore, it was necessary for the ground forces to acquire a few high performance liaison planes to carry out their operations.

Overview

Grasshoppers

Baptism by Fire

Cubs in Combat

POW