The War Department G3 responded to the overwhelming evidence from the field tat larger and better equipped aircraft were required by the AGF. In May 1944, the Department ordered the AGF to initiate procedures to procure a plane better suited to its purposes than the L-4. This was a period of the search for and testing of various planes to replace the L-4. During this period, the long-standing AAF position that AGF planes be used only for artillery fire adjustment suddenly changed.

In a declaration of long-term policy, dated 10 October 1944, the deputy commander of the AAF subscribed to the principle of organic aviation. Not only did he do this, but he observed that the new plane being selected by the AGF would possess capabilities far beyond those required for artillery fire adjustment. Furthermore, he observed, the AGF should "be encouraged to make maximum use" of those capabilities.

The AGF selected the Piper Corporation’s L-14 as its new standard Field Artillery liaison plane. This versatile aircraft was not produced in significant numbers before the war ended. The ground forces acquired only five before the contract was terminated. Consequently, L-5s as well as L-4s were used as ground forces replacement aircraft from late 1944 until the end of the war.

Reversal of the AAF policy on multiple missions and the acquisition of higher performance aircraft for organic aviation encouraged the AGF to attempt to expand the theoretical role of organic aviation. This policy change would make the theoretical role more closely correspond to the de facto role.

The first efforts were modest and solidly based on requests from theater commanders. On 5 January 1945, the AGF requested the assignment of L-5 liaison planes to cavalry reconnaissance squadrons. This would mean two additional planes would be assigned to armored divisions so as to improve reconnaissance capabilities.

The War Department G-3 promptly rejected this request, however, because of the shortage of L-5s and the need to conduct further study of the performance of AAF high-performance tactical reconnaissance aircraft in ground reconnaissance missions.

To comply with the War Department’s recommendation for further study of the air forces’ use of its tactical reconnaissance aircraft, the AAF sent two observers to Europe and other theaters in early 1945. These two observers were Colonel (COL) John C. Bennet, a former WWI pursuit pilot, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Williams, who served both AGF and the AAF during WWII.

They recognized and reported that the enlisted AAF liaison pilots lacked sufficient knowledge about the requirements of the AGF to perform their assigned missions adequately. Their reports were forwarded to AGF headquarters in April. These reports coincided with the ground forces’ point of view in every respect. The AGF used them to justify their new request for the expansion of organic aviation.

Accordingly in May 1945, the acting commanding general of the ground forces proposed that five light planes be provided to each infantry, airborne, armored, cavalry, and mountain division; he also proposed two planes be provided to each cavalry reconnaissance squadron. The request was accompanied by endorsements from theater commanders and a mass of testimony from the front regarding the need for these aircraft.

In spite of earlier indication that such organic aviation missions might be acceptable, the new deputy commander of the AAF, LTG Ira C. Eaker, renewed the claim air forces liaison squadrons should perform all liaison missions except for Field Artillery.

The new commander of the AGF, GEN Jacob L. Devers, strongly supported the proposal to expand organic aviation, as did also the chief of staff of the Army, GEN George C. Marshall. In a memorandum to the commanding general of the AAF, GEN Marshall observed he had studied the matter and strongly suggested the AAF "go along with this wholeheartedly and not reluctantly."

GEN Devers then met with the deputy commander of the AAF. They emerged from the meeting with an agreement for an even greater expansion of organic aviation than originally requested.

In the agreement approved by the War Department of 9 August 1945, six (instead of five) light planes were to be assigned to each infantry, airborne, and mountain division; nine to each cavalry division; two to each cavalry squadron and separate tank battalion; one to each separate engineer battalion; and two to each cavalry and tank destroyer. Since more appropriate aircraft had not been produced, the planes were to be L-4s and L-5s.

The war came to an end on 14 August 1945, a few days after the expansion of organic Army Aviation was authorized. In the meantime, the AGF had proceeded to gather evidence from the field to support the requests for the extension of organic aviation to include ground reconnaissance as well as other uses which had been and could be made of light planes.

Convincing evidence was collected and tests were conducted supporting the use of L-5s for close-in bombing and reconnaissance at night; as a moving platform for rocket launchers and for the new recoilless gun; and for dropping supplies and evacuating wounded. The war ended before the results of most of these studies and tests could be reviewed adequately or implemented in a systematic fashion.

The maximum number of organic Army aircraft in service during WWII is not easy to determine. Statistical records on equipment during the war were less complete than during later periods, and many of the records collected had subsequently been lost. According to a widely cited study by a U.S. Air Force historian, 750 air observation post sections had been activated by the end of January 1944; about "1,600 suitable liaison aircraft were available."

During the following year, the acquisition of 100 aircraft per year was intended to replace those lost through attrition. For most of 1945 and the early part of 1946, about 175 aircraft per month (with the ratio of six L-4s to one L-5) were acquired by the AGF.

If the attrition rate averaged about 100 per month during 1945 and declined significantly during early 1946, the maximum number of organic Army aircraft may have approached 3,000. Of this number, as many as 300 were probably L-5s. The estimated total of about 3,000 is supported by the artillery air operations reports of the armies operating in Europe in 1945.

These reports enabled The General Board, U.S. Forces European Theater, to report "approximately 1,380 Field Artillery aircraft were operating in the European Theater as of 1 May 1945.

Also, according to Andrew Ten Eyck, writing in 1946, "organic Field Artillery air observation… [came to have] more than 3,000 assorted Piper L-4s and Stinson L-5s in 1945."

In early 1946, through disposition of aircraft by the Surplus Property Board and otherwise, the number of aircraft in the inventory of organic Army Aviation rapidly declined. The inventory apparently fell below 300 before the Army began purchasing L-16s and L-17s in late 1947.